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Abstract—In the context of physical layer security, a physical
layer characteristic is used as a common source of randomness
to generate the secret key. Therefore an accurate estimation of
this characteristic is the core for reliable secret key generation.
Estimation of almost all the existing physical layer characteristic
suffer dramatically at low signal to noise (SNR) levels. In this
paper, we propose a novel secret key generation algorithm that
is based on the estimated angle of arrival (AoA) between the two
legitimate nodes. Our algorithm has an outstanding performance
at very low SNR levels. Our algorithm can exploit either the
Azimuth AoA to generate the secret key or both the Azimuth
and Elevation angles to generate the secret key. Exploiting a
second common source of randomness adds an extra degree of
freedom to the performance of our algorithm. We compare the
performance of our algorithm to the algorithm that uses the most
commonly used characteristics of the physical layer which are
channel amplitude and phase. We show that our algorithm has a
very low bit mismatch rate (BMR) at very low SNR when both
channel amplitude and phase based algorithm fail to achieve an
acceptable BMR.
Index Terms—Angle of Arrival, Direction of Arrival, Channel
Estimation, Secret Key, Bit Mismatch Rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the paradigm of physical layer secrecy, typically a
physical layer specific characteristic is used as key generator
to guarantee information hiding from eavesdroppers. Current
physical layer security techniques are based on channel reci-
procity assumption. In [1]–[5], channel measurements were
exploited to generate the secret key. One main drawback of
exploiting the channel reciprocity to generate the secret key
is that the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at both the
receivers affects the reciprocity of the channel measurements.
Also, both nodes must collect the measurement simultaneously
[6].
Moreover, the techniques that exploit the channel gain, are
based on the assumption that the channel gain is independent
of the distance. This assumption could be valid for non-line
of sight fading channel but not necessarily a valid assumption
for line of sight fading channel where attenuation is a function
of the propagation distance. In this case, an eavesdropper
with localization or distance estimation capabilities can then
estimate the channel gain and consequently recover the secret
key. Others exploit the channel phase to generate the secret
key as in [7]. For an accurate estimation of the channel phase,
a high SNR is required [8].
Other reciprocal (common) parameters such as received
signal strength (RSS) can be used as a common source
of randomness to generate the secret key [9]–[11]. RSS is
a very common metric that requires a simple circuitry to
be implemented. Nevertheless, its practical utilization as a
common source of randomness is limited because its key bit
generation rate is very low, particularly, for mobile scenarios
[12].
A recent physical layer security technique that is based on
the distance reciprocity to generate secret key bits is presented
in [13], [14]. Most of the currently deployed localization
technique exploit the RSS to estimate the distance between
the two communicating nodes [15]. Estimating the distance
based on RSS requires an accurate modelling of the channel
between the nodes. Moreover, it has a low estimation accuracy.
In [16], the distance estimation error was higher than 20%.
This implies that the secret key generated based on distance
will have a high bit mismatch rate (BMR), which is the ratio
of the bits that do not match at the two nodes as extracted from
the estimated distance. There are other techniques to perform
localization which are based on the time of arrival (TOA)
[17]–[20]. Although localization based on TOA has a higher
accuracy than RSS based, it requires a clock synchronization
between the two nodes [21]. Nevertheless, their estimation
error is high at low SNR (< 0 dB) [22].
A main drawback in almost all of the existing physical layer
security techniques, whether it is based on channel gain, RSS
or distance, is their poor performance at low signal to noise
ratio (SNR). Estimating the channel gain at low SNR levels
will result in a high error due to the effect of the AWGN.
Similarly, for the RSS and consequently distance estimation
based on the RSS.
To address this latter drawback, we propose a novel algo-
rithm that exploits the AoA between the two communicating
nodes. AoA estimation techniques can accurately function
even at very low SNR level. In addition to that we use
the 2-D AoA (azimuth AoA and elevation AoA), which is
estimated simultaneously, as a double common source of
randomness. In other words, we estimate two common sources
of randomness simultaneously. Exploiting a second common
source of randomness adds an extra degree of freedom and
increases the entropy of the generated secret key. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, exploiting the AoA as a common
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source of randomness has not been presented in the literature
before.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II the system model is presented. The AoA estimation is then
addressed in section III. Our secret key generation algorithm
is presented in Section IV. We evaluate the performance of
our algorithm in Section V. The paper is then concluded in
section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us assume that the two legitimate nodes, Alice and Bob,
exchange a signal s(t). Each of Alice’s or Bob’s receiver is
equipped with a smart antenna system consisting of M antenna
elements, separated by a fixed separation d and operating
at frequency f . When using M receivers, the received and
sampled signal x[n] in the matrix notation is:
X = as + V, (1)
where X is of size M × N with N being the total number
of received samples, s is of size 1 × N as seen from each
receiver, the steering vector a is of size M × 1 and V is the
AWGN matrix of size M ×N .
When using a single receiver to estimate the AoA as in our
newly developed Cross Correlation Switched Beam System
(XSBS) presented in [23], the received signal reduces to:
xk = aS + v, (2)
where xk, the received signal from the kth beam, is of size
1 × N , where k ∈ [1 : K], where K is the total number
of generated beams, S is of size M × N as seen by the M
elements of the antenna array and v is of size 1×N .
Each antenna array has an array response vector also known
as steering vector a(φ, θ) ∈ CM , where φ is the azimuth
angle and θ is the elevation angle. For a uniform circular array
(UCA), a(φ, θ), can be given by [24]:
a(φ, θ) = [eβr sin(θ) cos(φ−φ1), eβr sin(θ) cos(φ−φ2), (3)
..., eβr sin(θ) cos(φ−φM )],
where β = 2piλ is the wave number, λ is the wavelength and
r is the radius of the antenna array.
φm =
2pim
M
, m = 1, 2, ..,M, (4)
and φ ranges between [0, 2pi] and θ ranges between [0, pi]
To generate a secret key based on the estimated AoA, the
estimated AoA has to be common at both Alice and Bob.
In other words, both Alice and Bob estimate the same AoA,
whether it is 1-D (Azimuth only) only or 2-D (Azimuth and
Elevation). To do so, Both Alice and Bob agree only once on
a selected reference, let it be the North, along with a rotation
direction, let it be Clockwise as shown in Fig. 1 (a). In this
case, the estimated AoA at Alice φ1 is:
φ1 = φc, (5)
North
North
1φ
2φ
North
South1φ
2φ
(a) (b)
Node 1 Node 1
Node 2 Node 2
Fig. 1: AoA estimation reference: (a) Both have the same
reference, let it be the North and (b) Alice has the reference
as the North and Bob has the reference as the South.
where φc is the common AoA and the estimated AoA at Bob
φ2 is:
φ1 = φc + pi (6)
Therefore, Bob estimates the common AoA, simply, by sub-
tracting pi from its estimated AoA φ2. Another approach is that
Alice uses the selected reference, let it be the North and Bob
uses the opposite reference which is in this case the South. The
rotation direction for Both is still the same, let it be Clockwise.
As shown in Fig. 1 (b), the estimated AoAs are:
φ1 = φ2 = φc. (7)
To generate a sequence of AoA and use that sequence to
generate the secret key, at least one of the communication
nodes, i.e., either Alice or Bob, is assumed to be mobile.
III. AOA ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
There exists many techniques to estimate the AoA; some
of which are: beam switching, classical AoA techniques and
subspace techniques [25]–[29]. Subspace based techniques
perform better than classical techniques, particularly at low
SNR levels. This comes on the cost that they require a higher
computational complexity. The most popular AoA estimation
subspace based technique is the MUltiple SIgnal Classification
(MUSIC) presented in [30]. For 1-D AoA estimation, the
elevation angle θ is assumed to be 90 degrees. Therefore, the
steering vector for the UCA in (3) reduces to:
a(φ) = [eβr cos(φ−φ1), eβr cos(φ−φ2), (8)
..., eβr cos(φ−φM )],
The auto-covariance matrix of the received signal, Rxx has a
dimension M×M , i.e. M receivers are used. Rxx is estimated
as:
Rxx =
1
N
(
XXH
)
(9)
where H denotes the Hermitian matrix operation. The MUSIC
algorithm exploits the orthogonality of the signal and noise
subspaces. After an eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) on Rxx,
it can be written as:
Rxx = a(φ)Rssa
H(φ) + σ2I (10)
= UsΛsU
H
s + UvΛvU
H
v , (11)
where Rss is the autocovariance matrix of the transmitted
signal, σ2 is the noise variance, I is the unitary matrix, Us
and Uv are the signal and noise subspaces unitary matrices
and Λs and Λv are diagonal matrices of the eigenvalues of the
signal and noise. The spatial power spectrum for the MUSIC
technique is given by [30], [31]:
PMUSIC(φ) =
1
aH(φ)Pva(φ)
, (12)
where Pv = UvUHv .
Our XSBS collects an omni-directional reference signal,
xo, using a number of antennas in the antenna array with
setting the elements of the steering vector, a(φ), equal to
unity at selected elements (the antenna elements used as omni-
directional antennas) and equal to zero in the rest. Our XSBS
then starts to scan the angular region of interest and collect the
signals xk, for k ∈ [1 : K]. The cross correlation coefficient
between our omni-directional reference signal and the kth
signal, which is our XSBS spatial power spectrum, can be
given by:
Rko =
1
N
(
xkx
H
o
)
(13)
There are several ways to estimate the 2-D AoA as presented
in [32]–[34] where they use the cross correlation between
the received signal from an L-shaped antenna array. In [35],
they estimate the 2-D using a UCA based on the fourth order
cumulant of the the received signals. Another example in [36],
they use an antenna array that consists of a vertical linear
array to estimate θ using the MUSIC algorithm, they then use
a circular antenna array with θ fed to the MUSIC algorithm
again to estimate φ.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results for both the MUSIC
algorithm for M = 16, and for XSBS for M = 17, with five
antenna used as omni-directional antennas to collect xo with
a separation between each two antennas of 2 ∗ d to such that
the correlation between the signals received for the selected
antenna elements is minimized. The simulation results are for
φ = 270 degrees using a UCA and N = 100 samples (left),
N = 1000 samples (middle) and N = 2000 samples (right).
The simulation is at SNR = - 15 dB. One can see that both
algorithms have a remarkable performance at SNR levels as
low as -15 dB. The MUSIC algorithm is achieving a peak to
floor ratio (PFR) of 3, 10 and 13 for N = 100, N = 1000 and
N = 2000, respectively. On the other hand the PFR for the
XSBS 15, 19, and 23 for N = 100, N = 1000 and N = 2000,
respectively. Increasing the number of samples enhances the
performance of both algorithms. For an adequate number of
collected samples N = 1000, both algorithms will have a
decent performance even at very low SNR levels.
IV. SECRET KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
Both Alice and Bob start exchanging signals to estimate the
AoA and consequently generate the secret key. The steps to
generate the secret key based on the AoA are:
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Fig. 2: Spatial power spectrum of MUSIC vs. XSBS for φ =
270 degrees at SNR = -15 dB for N = 100 samples (left),
N = 1000 samples (middle) and N = 2000 samples (right).
A. Initialization
Both Alice and Bob agree on the reference as well as the
rotation direction, from which the AoA is estimated. This step
is performed only once at the beginning of communication
between them. It is not required to be applied each time Alice
and Bob communicate.
B. AoA Estimation
Both Alice and Bob estimate their AoA and based on
the selected reference, they estimate the common source of
randomness, i.e., φc for 1-D or φc and θc for 2-D. The
algorithm applied at either Alice or Bob does not necessarily
be the same. One can use the MUSIC if it can afford both the
computational and hardware complexity. The other can use
the XSBS if, for example, it is a portable device and can not
afford both computational and hardware complexities. Both
Algorithms as we showed earlier can operate in low SNR
levels. Other techniques could be used as well after studying
their performance at low SNRs to make sure that the generated
secret key will have a low BMR.
C. Quantization
Now that we have the common sources of randomness φc,
the third step of our algorithm is to convert it into a bit
stream suitable for the secret key generation. The conventional
secret key length is between 128 and 512 bits [4]. We use the
most popular technique for quantization which is the uniform
quantization [37]:
z = Q(y) y ∈ (pi, pi+1) (14)
where p is the interval and y is the input, which in this case is
estimated AoA. In the uniform quantization, the spaces along
the x-axis, i.e., time, is uniformly distributed. Similarly for the
spaces in the y-axis, i.e., the estimated AoA. We use nquan bits
and therefore 2nquan levels to quantize our common sources
of randomness and then convert the quantized decimal values
into bits.
D. Encoding
Although uniform quantization is easy to implement, in-
creasing the quantization bit number, dramatically degrades
the performance of the algorithm since the bit mismatch rate
between the two communicating nodes increases. In [3], an
encoding algorithm is proposed to tackle this problem where
each uniformly quantized value is encoded with multiple
values. We encode our most significant bit with nencod bits.
E. Combining the Two Bit Streams
Now that we have measured, quantized and encoded our two
common sources of randomness, which are the elevation AoA
and the Azimuth AoA, we have two bit streams containing
these data. To combine these two bit streams, any logical op-
eration such as AND, OR or concatenation can be applied on
the two bit streams to generate a single bit stream containing
both Azimuth and Elevation angles information. We choose
to use concatenation operation with the two bit streams as the
inputs to generate the single bit stream. Before we concatenate,
we drop the least significant nquan − ncombn bits from each
single bit stream, where ncomb is the number of bits selected
from each bit stream. It is worth noting that we chose a simple
bit operation to be applied on the bit streams for the sake of
simplification. One can apply a more complicated operation at
the bit streams such as bit masking or combinations of series
and parallel logical gates.
Up to this step, the key is generated and ready to be used to
encrypt the transmitted data. The following steps are optional
and preferred to be used at very low SNR levels (below -20
dB) where the generated key will have a considerable BMR.
F. Information Reconciliation
The generated bit streams at Alice and Bob might have some
discrepancy, particularly at very low SNR levels. This is due
to several reasons such as interference, noise and hardware
limitations. We adopt the reconciliation protocol presented in
[38] to minimize the discrepancy. Both Alice and Bob first
permute their bit streams in the same way. Then they divide
the permuted bit stream into small blocks. Alice then sends
permutations and parities of each block to Bob. Bob then
compares the received parity information with the ones he
already processed. In case of a parity mismatch, Bob changes
his bits in this block to match the received ones.
G. Privacy Amplification
Although information reconciliation protocol leaks mini-
mum information, the eavesdropper can still use this leaked
information to guess the rest of the secret key. Privacy am-
plification solves this issue by reducing the length of the
outputted bit stream. The generated bit stream is shorter in
length but higher in entropy. To do so, both Alice and Bob
apply a universal hash function selected randomly from a set
of hash functions known by both Alice and Bob. Alice sends
the number of the selected hash function to Bob so that Bob
can use the same hash function. Our algorithm is summarized
below.
Algorithm 1 Secret Key Generation algorithm
Step 0: Initialization
Alice and Bob agree on the reference and the rotation
direction from which they estimate the AoA.
Step 1: AoA Estimation
Alice and Bob estimate the common source(s) of ran-
domness, φc, or φc and θc, each using its implemented
technique.
Step 2: Uniform Quantization
Alice and Bob quantize the φc or φc and θc using nquan
bits to convert the decimal values into bits.
Step 3: Encoding
Alice and Bob encode each uniformly quantized value with
multiple values nencod.
Step 4: Combining the Two Bit Streams
Alice and Bob apply concatenate the two bit streams.
Step 5: Information Reconciliation (Optional for very low
SNR)
Alice and Bob permute the bit stream and divide them into
small blocks.
Alice sends the permutation and parities to Bob.
Bob compares the received parity information with his.
In case of mismatch, Bob corrects his bits accordingly.
Step 6: Privacy Amplification (Optional for very low SNR)
Alice sends the number of the hash function to Bob.
Alice and Bob apply the hash function to the bit stream.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To show that the secret key generated based on the estimated
AoA will have a low BMR at low SNR levels, we first plot
the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the estimated AoA for
the two algorithms; the MUSIC and the XSBS. The RMSE is
defined as:
RMSE =
√
E
(
(φˆc − φc)2
)
(15)
where E[.] denotes the mean operation and φˆc is the actual
estimated AoA of the true AoA, φc.
Fig. 3 presents the RMSE for both the MUSIC as well as
the XSBS versus SNR for different number of samples for the
Azimuth angle. The true Azimuth angle is φc = 270 degrees
and the RMSE is estimated according to Eq. (15). Table I
summarizes the RMSE values for both the MUSIC and the
XSBS for different number of samples at different SNR values
for the Azimuth angle . Table II summarizes the RMSE values
for both the MUSIC and the XSBS at different SNR values for
the Elevation angle for N = 1000 samples. The true Elevation
angle is θc = 90 degrees and the RMSE is estimated according
to Eq. (15).
From Tables I and II, one can see that both the MUSIC
and the XSBS have a low RMSE at low SNR levels. As the
SNR decreases, more samples are required to achieve a very
low RMSE. The XSBS outperforms the MUSIC algorithms,
TABLE I: RMSE for MUSIC vs. XSBS for the Azimuth angle.
SNR (dB)
RMSE (degrees)
N= 100 N= 1000 N= 2000
MUSIC XSBS MUSIC XSBS MUSIC XSBS
-10 0 0 0 0 0 0
-15 39 0 0 0 0 0
-20 115 0 29 0 5 0
-25 132 66 114 0 98 0
-30 135 126 131 61 129 20
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Fig. 3: RMSE vs. SNR for the MUSIC algorithm and for the
XSBS.
particularly at very low SNR levels. One can see that when
using an adequate number of samples, the RMSE of both
algorithm will be very low. Consequently, the secret key
generated using the estimated AoA as the seed will have a
low BMR.
We use the estimated RMSE to generate random Azimuth
and Elevation angles and use them as the seed to generate
the secret key. We compare the BMR of the generated keys
based on AoA with the BMR of the most commonly used
physical layer characteristics which are the channel gain and
phase. The simulation parameters for the subsequent Figures
4 to 7 are summarized in Table III. Also, the Legends for
the curves within the same figures are identified in Table IV.
We first use a single characteristic, i.e., amplitude only, phase
only, Azimuth angle only and Elevation angle only. We then
combine the channel amplitude and phase and combine the
Azimuth and Elevation angles to generate the secret key. It’s
worth noting that the acceptable BMR threshold as presented
in [14] is 0.15 to achieve a reliability condition.
For a fair comparison between the different common sources
of randomness, we first scale the sequence of information
collected to the same scaling level such that all common
sources of randomness used below, i.e., channel amplitude,
channel phase, Azimuth angle and Elevation angle fluctuate
within the same levels.
A. MUSIC vs. XSBS
In Fig. 4 we compare the performance of the MUSIC
algorithm versus the XSBS in generating the secret key. It
can be seen that the algorithm based on XSBS outperforms the
MUSIC based algorithm, which was expected since the RMSE
for the XSBS is lower than that for the MUSIC. The MUSIC
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Fig. 4: BMR for (a) MUSIC and (b) XSBS vs. SNR for
Azimuth angle, Elevation angle and both angles combined.
TABLE II: RMSE for MUSIC vs. XSBS for the Elevation
angle for N = 1000 Samples.
SNR (dB) RMSE (degrees)MUSIC XSBS
-10 0 0
-15 0 0
-20 8 0
-25 34 0
-30 37 20
based algorithm can operate within the acceptable range up to
- 17 dB, while the XSBS based can operate up to -27 dB.
B. Effect of number of quantization bits
The first observation aside from the effect of any parameter
whether it is the number of quantization bits or the encoding
bits, which can be seen from the subsequent Figures, that
our AoA based algorithm significantly outperforms both the
channel amplitude and phase based ones. It is shown that the
our algorithm has an operating range below the acceptable
threshold which varies according to the testing parameters.
Unlike the channel amplitude and phase based algorithm that
fail to have an operating range at that low SNR level by
achieving a BMR much higher than the acceptable threshold.
Also, it is worth noting that the upper bound on the BMR is
0.5 which is equivalent to random guessing. In other words,
TABLE III: Simulation parameters for the subsequent figures
Figure Algorithm Samples Quan. Bits Enc. Bits Comb. Bits
Fig. 4 Both 1000 7 2 2
Fig. 5 MUSIC 1000 6:9 2 5
Fig. 6 MUSIC 1000 7 1:4 5
Fig. 7 MUSIC 1000 7 2 3:6
TABLE IV: Legend
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Fig. 5: BMR for the AoA based algorithm vs. channel based
for (a) nquan = 6 and (b) nquan = 7 (c) nquan = 8 (d)
nquan = 9 .
the highest, i.e., the worst BMR is 0.5.
It is shown from Fig. 5 that as the number of quantization
bits increases, the performance of our algorithm deteriorates.
This is expected since as the number of quantization bits
increases, more levels are added. Therefore a smaller mismatch
or error between the estimated AoAs will lead to more
mismatched bit. The acceptable range using nquan = 7 is
as low as -16 dB using the Azimuth angle, -17 dB using the
Elevation angle and -22 using the combination of both of them.
C. Effect of number of Encoding bits
It is shown from Fig. 6 that as the number of encoding
bits increases, the performance of our algorithm improves.
As the number of encoding bits increases, more matched bits
are added to soothe the effect of quantization. The acceptable
range using nencod = 2 is as low as -16 dB using the Azimuth
angle, -17 dB using the Elevation angle and -22 using the
combination of both of them.
D. Effect of number of Combining bits
It is shown from Fig. 7 that as the number of combining
bits increases, the performance of our algorithm improves. In
addition to that, the higher the number of combining bits the
longer the generated key which is the main advantage of the
concatenation process. The acceptable range using ncomb = 5
is as low as -16 dB using the Azimuth angle, -17 dB using
the Elevation angle and -22 using the combination of both of
them.
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Fig. 6: BMR for the AoA based algorithm vs. channel based
for (a) nencod = 1 and (b) nencod = 2 (c) nencod = 3 (d)
nencod = 4.
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Fig. 7: BMR for the AoA based algorithm vs. channel based
for (a) ncomb = 3 and (b) ncomb = 4 (c) ncomb = 5 (d)
ncomb = 6.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel secret key generation
algorithm that is based on the estimated AoA between the
two legitimate nodes. We first showed that the RMSE for
the estimated AoA between Alice and Bob is very low at
very low SNR levels. We used both the 1-D AoA information
and the 2-D AoA information. Exploiting a second common
source of randomness adds an extra degree of freedom to the
algorithm since one can use either a single common source
or combine both of them in a way that minimizes the BMR.
We compared the performance of our algorithm to the most
widely used; the channel gain based algorithm. We showed
that our algorithm has significantly outperformed the channel
gain based algorithm at low SNR levels. We also studied the
effect of number of quantization bits, number of encoding
bit and number of combining bits on the performance of our
algorithm.
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